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SOCIAL LIMITS TO PRIVATIZATION
Tony Prosser*
I. INTRODUCTION
A very extensive literature has developed over the last
decade stating the justifications for privatization, to a large
degree based on experience in the United Kingdom as the
pioneer of a large privatization program. Little has been writ-
ten, however, on the limits to the privatization process. I hope
that this paper will go some way towards filling that gap.
I will not restrict myself to discussing the immediate social
consequences of privatization; these are fairly well documented
and need to be balanced against the necessity for privatization
in particular economies. I will attempt instead something more
ambitious. Drawing on material mainly from Western and
Central Europe, I will suggest some of the general consider-
ations which may limit the scope of successful privatization,
and which broadly share a basis in distributional and other
non-economic goals. It should be made clear at the outset that
they do not represent absolute limits on privatization in the
sense that where they are present transfer to the private sec-
tor cannot be successful. Nor should it be supposed that I am
proposing that the problems which they raise can be resolved
through old-style nationalization (though it should be borne in
mind that, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, an exten-
sive public sector of industry will remain with us for many
years into the future).' Rather my aim will be to suggest mat-
ters which have to be balanced against the well-rehearsed
arguments for privatization. There may be ways of resolving
the problems which these social considerations raise whilst
still engaging in successful sales, and I will suggest some of
them in this paper.
Two further caveats must be made. My experience is of
privatization in the United Kingdom, in the rest of Western
* John Millar Professor of Law, University of Glasgow, Scotland.
1. For critiques of the forms of nationalization adopted in the United King-
dom, see TONY PROSSER, NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES AND PUBLIC CONTROL 19-74
(1986) and NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OFFICE, A STUDY OF UK
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Europe, in Central Europe and to a limited degree in Eastern
Europe. However, in the words of a distinguished proponent of
the United Kingdom privatization program, "right-wing politi-
cians and thinkers often argue as if privatization were part of
some irreversible movement which will blaze around the globe
from its original site in Britain. In reality, the prediction of
social and economic events cannot be precise, especially that of
their timing."2 It now seems to be a unanimous view that it is
extremely dangerous to assume that transnational application
of experience in privatization is possible, and especially that
experience gained from Western Europe can be applied to the
marketizing economies of Central and Eastern Europe, let
alone to the rest of the world.3 Thus, as leading surveys of
Central European privatization have put it, "British-style
methods of privatization were shown to be of little use in the
largely sui generis situation of a post-communist economy,"4
and Western-style privatization "cannot serve as a model for
privatization in Eastern Europe, where capital markets do not
yet exist and the very structure of market economy is to be
introduced precisely through the process of privatization."' To
mention only one of the serious problems of the privatization
process in Central and Eastern Europe, the lack of financial
institutions and sources of domestic capital has led to a major
concern being to avoid forms of sale which result in control of
enterprises passing to the criminal "mafia" or the
"nomenklatura" of former managers and party officials, neither
of which are likely to exercise pressures for the improvement
of the economic efficiency of enterprises.6 This has not been a
serious problem in nations with developed financial institu-
tions and capital markets.! As a result of these national pecu-
liarities, every attempt to generalize about privatization across
2. C.D. FOSTER, PRIVATIZATION, PUBLIC OWNERSHIP AND THE REGULATION OF
NATURAL MONOPOLY 361 (1992).
3. For accounts of the particularity of national privatization experience, see
COsMO GRAHAM & TONY PROSSER, PRIVATIZING PUBLIC ENTERPRISES (1991); PRI-
VATIZATION AND REGULATORY CHANGE IN EUROPE (Michael Moran & Tony Prosser
eds., 1994).
4. ROMAN FRYDMAN ET AL., THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS IN CENTRAL EUROPE
177 (1993) (discussing privatization process in Poland).
5. ROMAN FRYDMAN & ANDRZEJ RAPACZYNSKI, PRIVATIZATION IN EASTERN
EUROPE: IS THE STATE WITHERING AWAY? 21 (1994).
6. Id. at 22.
7. Id. at 21.
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national boundaries is fraught with difficulty. Nevertheless,
the very difficulty of applying Western experience elsewhere
may be useful in revealing limits to the privatization process.
Secondly, in order to discuss the limits to the privatization
process usefully, we should know the rationales for the adop-
tion of a program of privatization in the first place. These are
highly varied, even in individual nations. Thus, in the United
Kingdom, the original impetus for privatization came from
short-term budgetary concerns in the form of the reduction of
the public sector borrowing requirement, soon accompanied by
the political theme of widening share ownership.' Increasing
the efficiency of industrial enterprises also became of para-
mount importance as did reducing opportunities for govern-
mental intervention, joined more recently by increasing the
transparency of regulation and relations with government and
the creation of more sophisticated regulatory institutions.9 In
Central and Eastern Europe the rationales for privatization
are equally varied, but are dominated by the need for funda-
mental economic reform:
The first thing to understand about the privatization process
in Eastern Europe is that, in contrast to other countries,
privatization, in the environment of the transitional econo-
mies, is not a simple transfer of ownership from the state to
private individuals. It is rather a process by which the very
institution of property, in the sense in which lawyers and
economists employ the term, is reintroduced into East Euro-
pean Societies."
This range of different reasons for privatization would not
matter so much were it not for the fact that different ratio-
nales may have contradictory practical implications. Thus, the
increasing of economic efficiency is normally seen as requiring
improved corporate governance in which closer scrutiny of
management takes place." This is contradicted by the im-
pulse towards wider share ownership in order to legitimate
8. MATHEW BISHOP & JOHN KAY, DOES PRIVATIZATION WORK? 4 (1988).
9. See GRAHAdI & PROSSER, supra note 3, at 19-33; see also J. Kay & D.
Thompson, Privatisation: A Policy in Search of a Rationale, 96 ECON. J. 18-32
(1986).
10. FRYDMAN & RAPACZYNSKI, supra note 5, at 10.
11. Id. at 60.
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privatization, which may lead to a fragmentation of control and
also make takeover of the enterprise more difficult. Again, this
problem is more acute in the former Communist countries,
where the fundamental problem may be the creation of effec-
tive corporate governance, yet the need to legitimize the privat-
ization process may lead to mass privatization techniques
which fragment control, or to the sale of enterprises to their
former managers on preferential terms.12 Neither is likely to
lead to improved monitoring of enterprise performance nor to
aid restructuring in order to face the demands of a developing
market economy. Nor is this problem limited to the former
Communist countries, for this conflict between a concentration
of ownership to permit effective corporate control and the wid-
ening of share ownership has become a serious problem in the
infant Italian privatization program. 3
Having understood that any attempt to apply privatization
experience across national boundaries is fraught with danger,
and that this is reinforced by the different rationales for pri-
vatization, often with contradictory practical implications, we
are in a position to attempt to suggest limits to the privatiza-
tion process. The first alleged limit to be discussed is, however,
one which is of questionable validity, yet is probably most
important in the legal constraints which may hinder a privat-
ization program.
II. A FALSE LIMIT TO PRiVATIZATION: THE INHERENT NATURE
OF CERTAIN ENTERPRISES AND THE CONCEPT OF A CORE OF
RESERVED STATE ACTIVITY
Especially during the early days of the United Kingdom
privatization program, a familiar argument leveled against it
was that certain enterprises were intrinsically the business of
government and so should remain under public ownership.
Examples were the public utilities such as telecommunications,
gas, electricity, water, and enterprises closely linked to govern-
ment such as those manufacturing armaments. In other na-
12. See id. at 23.
13. See Andrew Hill, Catalyst for Change, FIN. TIMES, July 7, 1994, at 36;
Robert Preston, An Intricate Web of Influence, FIN. TIMES, June 20, 1994, at 17;
Robert Preston, Berlusconi Faces Clash with Banker on Sell-Off, FIN. TIMES, June
20, 1994, at 1, 18; Roman Prodi Gets on His Bike, FIN. TIMES, June 6, 1994, at
20.
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tions, these arguments can be found reflected in a number of
constitutional provisions making the privatization of certain
enterprises more difficult. 4 The most familiar examples were
of course the former constitutions of the Communist countries,
but these provisions also exist elsewhere. For example, the
Preamble to the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic
provides that "[a]ll property and enterprises of which the run-
ning has, or acquires, the character of a national public service
or of an actual monopoly are to become public property."15 In
view of the loose definition of "public service" adopted by the
constitutional court,16 and the limitation of the privatization
program in France to competitive enterprises, this has not
caused serious problems. However, in Germany the Federal
Constitution makes special provision for the federal public
services such as railways, posts, telecommunications and air
traffic control. To achieve even partial privatization in these
cases, constitutional amendment has proved necessary, in turn
requiring a special Parliamentary majority. Consequently,
deals must be made with the Parliamentary opposition. In-
deed, some similarities with these provisions can be found in
the uncertain doctrine in United States federal constitutional
law restricting the delegation of governmental functions.'
These provisions may be of considerable importance in
shaping the way in which privatization has to be carried out;
indeed, by forcing a more demanding scrutiny for the most far-
reaching and irreversible types of privatization they may play
a role in increasing transparency and legitimacy in the privat-
ization process.18 The basic doctrine of a core of industrial ac-
tivity necessarily reserved to the state has, however, been ex-
ploded by experience in the United Kingdom. The privatization
program extended fairly quickly to the utilities including tele-
communications, gas and electricity and even (in England and
14. See Terence Daintith & Monica Sah, Privatisation and the Economic Neu-
trality of the Constitution, 1993 PUB. L. 465, 465-87.
15. GRAHAM & PROSSER, supra note 3, at 76 (translating the Preamble to the
Constitution of the Fifth Republic); see also id. at 43-47, 75-78.
16. Judgment of June 25-26, 1986 (Decision No. 86-207 DC), Con. const.,
available in LEXIS, Public Library, Consti File.
17. Daintith & Sah, supra note 14, at 475-76; see also Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935).
18. GRAHAM & PROSSER, supra note 3, at 241-52.
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Wales) to water distribution and supply, in which the retention
of regional monopoly was inevitable. It is now being extended
to the railways, another classic example of what in Europe has
traditionally been seen as a core public service activity, and
one where local monopolies are likely to continue indefinitely.
With the sales of British Aerospace and Royal Ordnance, the
manufacture of military equipment and of armaments has
been successfully privatized, as has management of the Royal
Dockyards. The internal operations of the civil service has been
subjected to a program of "market testing" in which those in
the service have been compelled to compete to retain their
work against competition from private contractors, 9 whilst
prison operation and aspects of policing are also facing the
possibility of operation by the private sector.
This is not to say that these privatizations have not been
accompanied by serious problems; the rest of this paper will
clearly demonstrate that such problems have occurred in many
cases. It is also clear that the nature of the enterprise being
sold or contracted out will be important in determining the
type of privatization which is likely to prove successful. Howev-
er, the United Kingdom experience shows quite clearly that
there is no core of governmental activity which cannot be pri-
vatized.
III. IMPLEMENTING GOVERNMENT POLICY THROUGH PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISES
A related argument concerns enterprises which are going
to be closely linked to the implementation of governmental
policy. It has been argued that such enterprises are unsuitable
for privatization simply because public control necessarily
involves public ownership. Examples would include strategic
industries of great national importance, such as the telecom-
munications and energy utilities, airports, or the national flag-
carrying airline. In this respect as well, experience in the Unit-
ed Kingdom has shown that the equation of public control with
public ownership is too simple; it is not impossible to privatize
whilst retaining important means of governmental interven-
tion, but problems are raised of how that intervention will take
19. See COMPETING FOR QUALITY: BUYING BETTER PUBLIC SERVICES, 1991, Cm
1730.
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place and how it will be coordinated for the different enter-
prises.
One device adopted for maintaining a degree of govern-
mental control of privatized enterprises has been that of the
golden share which was present in the case of many United
Kingdom sales, and is now being employed as a key feature of
the French and Italian privatization programs.2' To simplify
some complex and flawed provisions, they have two major
aims. The first is to provide a "breathing space" for companies
to establish themselves after privatization without the threat
of hostile takeover, and so cannot really be seen as an example
of the implementation of public policy in the long term. The
second is to keep the enterprise under national control in the
longer term, and effectively takes the form of giving the gov-
ernment power to veto changes in restrictions on shareholding,
thereby limiting hostile takeovers. In a few cases (British Aero-
space, Rolls-Royce and British Airways) the provisions specifi-
cally incorporated restrictions on foreign ownership, though
these are seriously limited for members of the European Union
by Article 221 of the Treaty of Rome, which provides for equal
treatment of nationals of member states as regards the partici-
pation in the capital of companies, subject to exceptions includ-
ing the protection of essential interests of state security in
connection with arms and munitions. In most cases, however,
golden shares were temporary provisions to provide an initial
freedom from the threat of hostile takeover for newly privat-
ized companies. This was confirmed by the government's deci-
sion not to use its golden share in the electricity distribution
companies to demand a share of the proceeds from their sale of
the electricity grid on the ground that the share was only in-
tended to prevent foreign ownership.2
The golden share provisions have been of very little effect
in the United Kingdom, partly because of their limited nature,
partly because of bad drafting, but perhaps more fundamental-
ly because their existence contradicts an important justifica-
tion for privatization in a United Kingdom context; that the
20. For the background to "golden shares," see GRAHAM & PROSSER, supra
note 3, at 141-51; Cosmo Graham & Tony Prosser, Golden Shares: Industrial Poli-
cy by Stealth? 1988 PUB. L. 413, 413-31.
21. Roland Rudd, Government to Forgo Profits from National Grid Sell-Off,
FIN. TIMEs, Aug. 29, 1994, at 16.
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market for corporate control, largely implemented through
hostile takeovers, is a key mechanism for increasing enterprise
efficiency. The limited role they have played may thus be
largely attributed to two special national characteristics; first-
ly, the relatively important role played by hostile takeovers as
a means of market control in the United Kingdom, and second-
ly a relatively open system of markets in which keeping out
foreign capital is not an aim of government policy. The argu-
ment that the preservation of national independence is essen-
tial in privatization has thus played a very small role in the
United Kingdom, but may be crucial elsewhere.22 Ironically,
the one case where this did emerge as a key issue, that of the
amassing of a substantial holding in British Petroleum by the
Kuwait Investment Office, involved a privatized company in
which no golden share had been retained. Nevertheless, it
proved possible to require a reduction in the holding by using
ordinary competition law.23 Rather similarly, in considering
the rival bids for the privatized submarine and warship build-
ing yard of VSEL from British Aerospace and GEC the Govern-
ment has stated it will not use its golden share, and discussion
of its role in the sale has concentrated on competition policy
and government as purchaser rather than as holder of the
golden share.24 Criticisms have also been made of the lack of
accountability provided by company law for the exercise or
nonexercise of golden shares,25 although in France the use of
similar provisions was required by the constitutional court to
be accompanied by the giving of reasons and the availability of
judicial review.2"
22. See FRYDMAN & RAPACZYNSKI, supra note 5, at 24; Sabino Cassese, Dereg-
ulation and Privatization in Italy, in PRIVATIZATION AND REGULATORY CHANGE IN
EUROPE, supra note 3, at 50, 63.
23. See GRAHAM & PROSSER, supra note 3, at 162-63.
24. See Base Rate Basics: VSEL, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1994, (the Lex Column)
at 16; Bernard Gray, Battle for VSEL Intensifies After GEC Offers £532m, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 29/30, 1994, at 1, 6; Bernard Gray, Bids For Submarine Maker to
Face UK Monopolies Inquiry, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1994, at 1; Bernard Gray, Britain
Puts Off a Tough Decision, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1994, at 17; Ministry Limits VSEL
Takeover, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1994, at 9.
25. GRAHAM & PROSSER, supra note 3, at 144-51; Graham & Prosser, supra
note 20.
26. Judgment of July 4, 1989 (Decision No. 89-254 DC) (Loi Modifiant la Loi
No 86-912 du 6 Aofit 1986 Relative aux Modalites d'Application des Privations),
Con. const., available in LEXIS, Public Library, Consti File; see also GRAHAM &
PROSSER, supra note 3, at 159.
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Much more important than the use of golden shares in the
United Kingdom has been the use of regulatory powers which
permit governmental intervention after privatization. This is
not the place for a detailed exposition of the regulatory ar-
rangements which have been adopted for the utility enterpris-
es, and some of the problems raised will be discussed later in
this paper." It should simply be noted that regulation has
imposed serious constraints on the utility enterprises, particu-
larly on pricing and on interconnection with other service pro-
viders. Indeed, such have been the constraints that at least one
privatized industry chairman has been quoted as claiming that
his enterprise now faces more intervention from the public au-
thorities than was the case under nationalization." The most
important public face of regulation is that of the regulatory
agencies established at arm's length from government; how-
ever, this should not disguise the fact that government itself
has retained important regulatory powers. Thus, it issues li-
censes permitting enterprises to operate in such areas as tele-
communications, electricity and gas, determining the degree of
competition which will be faced by a privatized enterprise, and
the initial license granted by the minister to the enterprise will
contain the key regulatory provisions under which it must
operate.2 Government will also retain more particular powers
of intervention. These are especially important in the case of
the electricity and water industries. In the case of electricity,
examples include the power to require the use of non-fossil fuel
(mainly nuclear) generating capacity for a proportion of each
electricity supplier's sources, the power to require the main-
tenance of coal stocks at specified levels at power stations and
to direct generators to operate, or not operate, stations at spec-
ified levels of capacity or using specified fuels. In relation to
the latter provision, "It is not too far-fetched to say that it
would allow the Secretary of State to take over the operation of
the [industry] or a large part of it notwithstanding its
27. For an outline, see Tony Prosser, Regulation of Privatized Enterprises:
Institutions and Procedures, in CAPITALISM, CULTURE AND ECONOMIc REGULATION
135, 135-65 (Leigh Hancher & Michael Moran eds., 1989); see also GRAHAM &
PROSSER, supra note 3, at 175-240.
28. See, e.g., CENTO VELJANOVSKI, THE FUTURE OF INDUSTRY REGULATION IN
THE UK: A REPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT INQUIRY 23 (1993); cf. FOSTER, supra note
2, at 352.
29. For details, see Prosser, supra note 27, at 145-46.
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privatization." ° For water, key ministerial powers include
those giving him or her the power to set water quality stan-
dards and objectives in relation to environmental pollution. 1
Ministerial powers are not limited to the large utilities; thus,
for example, in relation to airports, the minister has power to
promulgate traffic distribution rules and to limit aircraft move-
ments.32
This brief summary suggests that it is possible for govern-
ments to retain wide-ranging powers after privatization which
can be used when needed to impose important constraints on
enterprises. However, policy implementation is rarely con-
cerned with discrete questions which affect only one enterprise,
and problems have been encountered where there has been a
need for the coordination of various industries which are sub-
ject to different regulatory regimes and different forms of mar-
ket pressures, notably in the field of energy.3 The most
striking example, in the United Kingdom, is the effect of the
privatization of the electricity industry on the coal industry, of
which it had long been the major consumer, purchasing over
80% of coal produced. After electricity privatization, a number
of the regional electricity supply companies invested heavily in
new gas turbine generation plant which was likely to increase
its share of generation from a negligible one to 25% of the
market by 1995-1996. (There was widespread controversy as to
whether this was in reality a cheaper form of generation, or
whether it represented a means of transferring profits from the
regulated consumer market to unregulated equity partici-
pations in generation by the supply companies at the expense
of captive consumers to whom generation costs could be passed
on.)34 There was also a concern that gas is too useful and ver-
satile a fuel to be used in this way when alternatives were
available, and that United Kingdom gas reserves could be
30. Electricity Act, 1989, ch. 29, §§ 32-34 & annot. § 34 (Current Law Stat-
utes Annotated 1989) (Eng.).
31. Water Industry Act, 1991, ch. 51, §§ 67-69 (Eng.); Water Resources Act,
1991, ch. 57, §§ 82-84 (Eng.).
32. Airports Act, 1986, ch. 31, §§ 31-34 (Eng.).
33. See DAN CORRY ET AL., REGULATING OUR UTILITIES 30-34 (1994).
34. See HOUSE OF COMMONS TRADE AND INDUS. SELECT COMM., FIRST REPORT,
BRITISH ENERGY POLICY AND THE MARKET FOR COAL, HC 237, 1992-1993 SESS. 9
80 (1993).
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exhausted as a result, forcing dependence on imported gas."5
The "rush to gas" represented one important reason for a sud-
den collapse in the coal market; sales to the generators were to
fall from 65 million tons to 40 million tons in 1993-1994 and
30 million tons in the following years. As a result, thirty-one
out of the fifty mines in the coal industry were to close, and an
irreversible loss of energy supply, it was argued, was the price
paid for short-term profit advantage.
The proposed closures produced a public outcry, and a
report by a House of Commons Select Committee was highly
critical of the lack of an overall energy policy creating a long-
term framework for the operation of market forces.36 The
Government's response rejected the exercise of closer control
over the development of gas generation; thus, its licensing was
not to be restricted and questions of the need for gas genera-
tors, their capacity, and the choice of fuels and plant type were
to be left to the applicants for generation licenses." There
was indeed no power to impose conditions relating to such
matters where consent had already been granted, and in the
case of future consents no such conditions would be imposed.
This was an unsurprising response from a government
which believes that energy policy goals are achieved most fully
through market mechanisms, and that the costs of adjustment
are best dealt with by limited and brief subsidies for the indi-
viduals and communities affected. However, not all govern-
ments will be content to take this approach, and the message
from this experience will be that individual privatizations will
affect whole sectors, and regulatory powers related to individu-
al industries may not be able to deal adequately with the ef-
fects elsewhere. A government intending to implement a proac-
tive energy policy is not likely to gain through privatizing the
electricity industry in the way this was done in the United
Kingdom. Even here though, it is worth noting that the power
to refuse consent for gas generating stations was available to
35. Id. 168.
36. Id. 281.
37. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, THE PROSPECTS FOR COAL: CONCLU-
SIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S COAL REVIEW, 1993, Cm 2235, %%9 13.24-.26. For the
licensing power, see the Electricity Act, 1989, ch. 29, § 36 (Eng.).
38. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 74-75 concerning governmen-
tal subsidies.
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the government, and the failure to do so was an expression of
its policies rather than an absence of legal means to do so.
In addition to golden shares and regulation, governments
may also influence the behavior of privatized enterprises
through contractual techniques. This is, of course, a phenome-
non well-known in the United States, both in the form of "gov-
ernment by contract," the use of contractual techniques to
implement policy goals, and in the day-to-day business of gov-
ernment procurement. Contractual relations between govern-
ment and privatized enterprises have also assumed consider-
able importance in the United Kingdom, having previously
been used as a means of reorganization of private industries in
key sectors.39 Special problems exist in this country, however,
concerning accountability for contractual interventions;" nei-
ther the sophisticated procedural protection offered to the
contracting process by United States federal law nor the spe-
cial legal regimes for government contracts associated with
Continental European jurisdictions exist, although European
Community law is beginning to fill the gap.4
The use of the administrative contract is assuming one
particularly important role as the privatization program ad-
vances: that of providing a framework for the privatization of
enterprises which are not likely to be profitable. This is most
apparent in the current process of privatization of the rail
network. The new system is based around the separation of
the running of the network, such as tracks and signals from
the provision of services on it. The latter will be carried out by
operators who hold franchise agreements, a form of adminis-
trative contract agreed by a franchising director in accordance
with objectives laid down by the Secretary of State. The fran-
chises will specify the service standards to be met by opera-
tors, and the director will provide funds for each operator (it is
unlikely that more than one of the 25 operating companies will
be profitable without the provision of public funds).42 The aim
is to provide competition for the franchise while still permit-
39. See GRAHAM & PROSSER, supra note 3, at 54-56, 164-66.
40. For a survey of the legal position, see Terence Daintith, Regulation by
Contract: the New Prerogative, 32 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 41 (1979).
41. See IAN HARDEN, THE CONTRACTING STATE 52-57 (1992).
42. For the highly complex system involved, see Railways Act, 1993, ch. 43
(Eng.); NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE RAILWAYS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF BRITISH
RAIL, 1992, Cm 2021.
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ting the provision of public funds to ensure the continuation of
services. It is hoped that competitive disciplines and the neces-
sity of specifying costs for individual services will increase
transparency and drive down operating costs, though consider-
able difficulties have been met in the allocation of joint costs
between operators. It is also important that the prospect of
continuing governmental support is a secure one, for otherwise
uncertainty will deter bidders and drive up subsidy costs.43
Despite these problems, the rail example shows that there
is no reason of principle why unprofitable activities cannot be
privatized, and this is indeed one important role for the use of
contractual techniques by government to ensure the provision
of public services after privatization. However, the fact that
this is possible in principle does not mean that is always the
best choice in practice, a point to which I shall return in dis-
cussing the matter of transaction costs below. It simply re-
mains to be said that governments do possess a variety of tech-
niques which can be used to implement policy after privatiza-
tion, although the exercise of these techniques can raise a
number of problems in practice. The need to continue to imple-
ment public policy is not in itself a limit to privatization, al-
though the practical means of doing so will need careful as-
sessment.
IV. THE SOCIAL COSTS OF PRIVATIZATION
The previous sections of this article have examined some
of the issues raised by the nature of enterprises being privat-
ized and their relationship with government. I will now exam-
ine more specifically social questions which directly raise
distributional concerns and-questions of how the privatization
process can retain legitimacy, and the resolution of these con-
cerns which are directly related to the potential success of
privatization.
In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, policies of
privatization have become associated clearly in the public mind
with increased unemployment. To give some examples of rises
43. See CHRISTOPHER FOSTER, THE ECONOMICS OF RAIL PRIVATISATION (Centre
for the Study of Regulated Industries Discussion Paper No. 7, 1994); BR Boss
Backs Subsidies, FIN. TnES, Dec. 5, 1994, at 6 (speech of the Chairman of British
Rail).
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in the unemployment rate, the official rate rose from zero per-
cent in 1989 to 11.4% at the end of 1991 in Poland," from
zero percent to 5.5% at the end of 1992 in the former Czecho-
slovakia (11.3% in the Slovak Republic),45 and from zero per-
cent to eight percent by the end of 1991 in Hungary.46 This is,
of course, highly misleading as an assessment of the impact of
privatization, for large-scale privatization had barely got off
the ground during this period, and a number of other economic
changes were having serious effects on employment. Neverthe-
less, evidence from the United Kingdom suggests very clearly
that both the preparation for privatization and privatization
itself coincide with severe reductions in the numbers of em-
ployees. This is, of course, clearest in what can be seen as
declining industries. Thus, in the case of coal, the nationalized
coal enterprise employed 232,410 people in 1979,"7 a figure
which dropped to 104,400 in 1988.48 Upon privatization in
1994, it had an estimated 18,868 employees.49 In British
Steel, employment in 1979 was 186,000, falling to 54,000 at
privatization in 19880 and 40,200 in 1993.51 Serious job loss-
es can also be found, however, in enterprises in expanding
markets. Thus, British Airways had 57,741 staff in 1979;"2
this number was reduced to 40,271 at privatization in 1987,
but by 1993 had climbed to 48,960."3 British Telecom had
233,447 staff while within the Post Office in 1979, a figure
which had risen to 238,384 at privatization in 1979, but which
had fallen to 156,000 in 1994."4
These figures must be treated with considerable caution
44. Andrew Berg & Oliver J. Blanchard, Stabilization and Transition: Poland,
1990-91, in I THE TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE: COUNTRY STUDIES 54 (Oliver
J. Blanchard et al. eds., 1994).
45. Karel Dyba & Jan Svejnar, Stabilization and Transition in Czechoslovakia,
in 1 TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE: COUNTRY STUDIES, supra note 44, at 93, 96.
46. Kemal Dervis & Timothy Condon, Hungary-Partial Success and Removing
Challenges: The Emergence of a "Gradualist" Success Story?, in 1 TRANSITION IN
EASTERN EUROPE: COUNTRY STUDIES, supra note 44, at 123, 134-35.
47. BISHOP & KAY, supra note 8, at 45.
48. Id.
49. BRITISH COAL CORPORATION, ANNUAL REPORT 1993/94, at 24 (1994).
50. BISHOP & KAY, supra note 8, at 45.
51. BRITISH STEEL PLC, REPORT & ACCOUNTS 1993/94, at 20 (1994).
52. BISHOP & KAY, supra note 8, at 45.
53. BRITISH AIRWAYS, BRITISH AIRWAYS PLC REPORT & ACCOUNTS 1992-93, at
1 (1993).
54. BRITISH TELECOMIUNICATIONS, REPORT & ACCOUNTS 38 (1994).
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when it comes to allocating responsibility for job losses to pri-
vatization itself. Other influences have been responsible for the
world wide decline in some basic manufacturing industries and
technological change. It would be possible to argue, at consid-
erable length, about the extent to which these job losses would
have occurred without privatization, and the degree to which
they represent a reallocation of labor to more efficient use
elsewhere in the economy. Nevertheless, in some ways it is
perception rather than the actual role of privatization which
matters, and there is clear evidence that the privatization
process has been blamed for threatening jobs. Even in the case
of the water industry, where employment has increased since
privatization due to diversification, a study of the workforce
found "widespread and deeply felt fears for the future" concern-
ing job security.5 The association of privatization with the
horrors of unemployment has been exacerbated by the fact that
in many cases, such as coal and steel, the job losses have been
concentrated in particular regions and even communities
where there is a strong traditional loyalty to the public sector
employer and minimal alternative employment opportunities.
Thus, two issues must be confronted by privatizing govern-
ments: how to maintain popular consent for privatization, and
the extent to which alternative economic measures may be
used to maintain employment levels.
Maintaining popular consent for privatization has involved
measures directed at both the population as a whole and at the
management and workforce of the concerns being sold. From
early on in the United Kingdom privatization program, the
wide distribution of shares among the population was to have
been achieved through large-scale flotations of the largest
enterprises, and a number of mechanisms, including vouchers
to be set against utility bills and free bonus shares were in-
tended to attract private investors, for whom a proportion of
the shares were reserved. This was backed up by popular ad-
vertising campaigns. Share purchases were also made more
attractive by the fact that a number of the larger sales result-
ed in a large premium for the initial investors due to under-
55. PETER SAUNDERS & COLIN HARRIS, PRIVATIZATION AND POPULAR CAPITAL-
ISM 78-87 (1994).
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pricing of shares. 6 Superficially, this policy appeared success-
ful; the number of shareholders in the United Kingdom rose
from 3 million in 1979 to around 11 million by the early 1990s.
However, the proportion of shares owned by private investors
declined during the privatization program, partly because of
the major role played by institutions in the flotations and part-
ly because of sales of shares by small investors after flotations
to take advantage of what were sometimes very large premia.
Thus privatization certainly did not represent a democratiza-
tion of share ownership in the sense of increasing the overall
role of the small investor. Recent survey work in the water
industry suggests that, whilst fear of renationalization may
have provided short term electoral help to the government, the
spread of shareholding has done little to change overall social
attitudes; moreover, popular hostility to privatization has
grown since the mid-1980s. This has been due to a belief that
essential services should remain in the public sector, that pri-
vatization increases prices, and that as public enterprises were
owned by all citizens it was wrong to sell them. 7 The study
concludes:
All the indications from our survey are that the spread of
share ownership has been irrelevant and inconsequential in
the government's desire to foster an enterprise culture in
Britain. Share ownership does not change people's attitudes
about "enterprise", capitalism, the market economy or the
role of government. If Britain does become a "nation of share-
holders" over the next decades, this is unlikely to have any
impact on the national culture. 8
Steps were also taken through preferential terms, includ-
ing free shares and discounts, to encourage the take-up of
shares by the workforce and management of enterprises being
privatized. In this case, what does seem to have been impor-
tant is the freeing of senior management from the constraints
of public sector pay control, resulting in huge increases in
salary after privatization; between 1979 and 1988, top execu-
tive salaries in privatized concerns increased fourfold in real
terms, a process which has continued since.5 9 Once more, it
56. For details, see GRAHAM & PROSSER, supra note 3, at 89-97.
57. SAUNDERS & HARRIS, supra note 55, at 120-37, 138-67.
58. Id. at 161.
59. See BISHOP & KAY, supra note 8, at 64-68; SAUNDERS & HARRIS, supra
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seems that there was very little success in creating a new
corporate culture legitimating privatization throughout the
privatized companies; indeed, in the case of water, the effect
seems to have been to increase polarization between manage-
ment and workforce, with the latter remaining largely hostile
to the change in ownership." Another technique for manage-
ment and workforce involvement was to encourage manage-
ment/employee buy-outs where disposal was by trade sale
rather than flotation; this technique was used, for example, to
dispose of most of the regional bus companies, and buy-out
teams seem likely to be the most important bidders for the rail
operating franchises.61 Sometimes preferential terms were
adopted to assist such buy-outs, and contributions made to
their organizational costs by government. The subsequent
history of buy-outs has been mixed; in the case of successful
businesses, they have been floated with large financial gains to
buy-out participants, normally after considerable cuts in the
labor force; other buy-outs have met with serious financial
difficulties. Nevertheless, the prospect of gains on flotation
later may be one way of attracting management support for
sales.
Overall United Kingdom experience thus suggests that
attempts to legitimize privatization through popular and work-
ers shareholdings have had only limited success; they may
have given the government some short-term electoral advan-
tage, but did very little to change overall attitudes to business.
Similar techniques have been used in Central Europe, and
here they raise the question of corporate governance in an
acute form. Partly to counter the shortage of domestic capital,
but also in an attempt to make the privatization process more
popular, mass privatization through the issue of vouchers has
been employed, involving what is effectively the free distribu-
tion of shares. The technique was pioneered on a large scale in
Czechoslovakia, and employed more recently in Poland and in
Russia.62 The problem of corporate governance has arisen
through the fact that the process can result, if uncontrolled, in
note 55, at 83-84.
60. SAUNDERS & HARRIS, supra note 55, ch. 4.
61. See Steve Thompson et al., Management Buy-Outs from the Public Sector:
Ownership Form and Incentive Issues, FISCAL STUDS., Aug. 1990, at 71.
62. For details, see FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 79-91, 194-97.
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a fragmentation of ownership leaving management effectively
uncontrolled and unscrutinized. One solution lies in the role of
the investment funds which will act as intermediaries in man-
aging holdings on behalf of individual investors. Although
some degree of regulation was later introduced, these funds
arose in a spontaneous and unregulated way in the former
Czechoslovakia, and their possible failure to meet some of their
more extravagant claims for the rise in value of the holdings
they will manage is seen as a major problem for the privatiza-
tion process, a point given extra poignancy by the collapse of
the MMM investment fund in Russia during the summer of
1994.63 In Poland, by contrast, intermediaries, in the form of
National Investment Funds, were deliberately created as part
of the privatization process, and 60% of shares will be distrib-
uted to them; they will be charged with monitoring the perfor-
mance of companies in their portfolio and will be active in
their management and restructuring, having membership on
the supervisory boards.64 This would appear to be a more ef-
fective way of combining popular participation in the privatiza-
tion process and an improvement in corporate control through
privatization.
The issue of preference for existing managers and
workforce has also become a major issue in privatization in
Eastern and Central Europe. An early phase of post-Commu-
nist development was that of "spontaneous privatization" in
which enterprises were transferred to their management with-
out central control of the process, and as a result, transfers
were at artificially reduced prices which enriched managers,
reinforced their control over the enterprises, and discredited
the concept of privatization. In later stages of privatization,
various forms of employee preference have been adopted in
order to gain management support, especially in Russia. 5
Again, the result is to cement the role of previous management
and to hinder prospects of restructuring and improved corpo-
rate control; this problem has been recognized in Russia, and
63. See Karel Dyba & Jan Svejnar, Stabilization and Transition in Czecho-
slovakia, in 1 THE TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE: COUNTRY STUDIES, supra note
44, at 93, 115-16; Mejstrik & Sojka, Privatization and Regulatory Change: The
Case of Czechoslovakia, in PRIVATIZATION AND REGULATORY CHANGE IN EUROPE,
supra note 3, at 66, 78-79.
64. FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 194-97.
65. See FRYDMAN & RAPACZYNSKI, supra note 5, at 179-83.
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in the second round of sales, steps will be taken to increase the
powers of shareholders to change management.66
The message from the progress of privatization in Central
and Eastern Europe is that, in the absence of the sort of mech-
anisms for effective corporate control which exist in the West,
measures to make privatization more popular through widen-
ing popular shareholding and providing preferential terms for
management and workforce may actually hinder the process of
restructuring which is required by other types of economic
reform. The position has been summarized succinctly by the
leading commentators on the privatization process in Central
Europe:
[L]ike some of the flawed sales plans, a program of free dis-
tribution to workers threatens to leave things much as they
are and to impede the economic restructuring efforts. (This is
not to say, of course, that the interests of the workers are not
very important or that they should not be protected by some
institutional arrangements. The- appropriate institutional
protection of the workers' interests, however, should come in
the form of trade unions and governmental regulation of
employment conditions, rather than worker ownership.)67
One example of the sort of measure which can provide
such a protection for employment measures is the Acquired
Rights Directive which applies to member states of the Europe-
an Union.6' This aims to prevent restructuring being carried
out to the detriment of employees by transferring existing
terms and conditions of employment to a new employer to
whom an enterprise is transferred and providing that such a
transfer does not provide a ground for dismissal. The legal
problems of the application of the Directive are considerable
and controversial,69 but it does provide one means of lessening
the perceived threat to employment conditions posed by privat-
ization.
Another question is the nature of the economic measures
66. John Lloyd, Second Wave of Sell-offs Due Next Month, FIN. TIMES, June
20, 1994, at 3.
67. FRYDMAN & RAPACZYNSKI, supra note 5, at 25.
68. Council Directive 77/187, 1977 O.J. (L 61) 26.
69. See generally Cases 382/92, 382/93, Commission v. United Kingdom, [1994]
1 E.C.R. 2435, 2479; BRIAN NAPIER, CCT, MARKET TESTING AND EMPLOYMENT
RIGHTS: THE EFFECTS OF TUPE AND THE ACQUIRED RIGHTS DIRECTIVE (1993).
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which can be taken to stave off redundancies or to lessen their
effects. The former raises important questions of competition
law and the role of state aids granted in the process of restruc-
turing before privatization; for members of the European Un-
ion these are subject to the control of the European Commis-
sion which will scrutinize such aids to establish whether they
are in conformity with the EC Treaty. The role of such aids is
a highly controversial question, especially since the Commis-
sion ruled that the privatization of the United Kingdom car
manufacturer Rover involved inducements to the purchaser
which breached Community law and so had to be repaid. °
Examples of critical examination by the Commission of pre-pri-
vatization restructuring plans involving state aid have also
involved the French computer company Bull, and Air France.
In the latter case the Commission permitted the granting of
FFr 20 billion of aid conditional on a restructuring plan and
the commencement of privatization once recovery has been
achieved, having regard to the situation in the financial mar-
kets; nevertheless, the approval of the aid provoked vehement
protests from rival airlines and other governments and it is
being challenged before the European Court of Justice by the
United Kingdom government and seven rival airlines.7 The
aid to Bull was also approved as a final payment to permit
restructuring before privatization.12 Another illustrative ex-
ample is that of the German Government whose aids to ship-
yards in the former East Germany were permitted only under
strict conditions by the Commission, including a genuine and
irreversible reduction in shipbuilding capacity. The Govern-
ment now faces challenge by competing Danish shipbuilders on
the basis that these conditions have been breached. 3 The use
70. Tony Prosser & Michael Moran, Conclusion: From National Uniqueness to
Supra-National Constitution, in PRIVATIZATION AND REGULATORY CHANGE IN EU-
ROPE, supra note 3, at 145, 152. See generally Case 0-249/90, British Aerospace
ple v. Commission, 1992 E.C.R. 493, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 853.
71. For a discussion of the role of the Commission in these circumstances, see
Prosser & Moran, supra note 70, at 148-53. The Commission decision approving
aid to Air France is Commission Decision 94/653, 1994 O.J. (L 254) 73. For the
challenge to the aid, see UK Joins European Airlines to Fight Aid for Air France,
FIN. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1994, at 1.
72. The Commission decision suspending aid to Bull is Commission Decision
94/220, 1994 O.J. (L 107) 61. For the final decision permitting it, see Emma Tuck-
er & John Ridding, Brussels Approves $2.1 Bn Rescue for Bull, FIN. TIMES, Oct.
13, 1994, at 2.
73. Hilary Barnes, Danes Attack Brussels Over Ship Subsidies, FIN. TIMES,
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of state aids is likely to become even more controversial. The
European Commission cannot require that an enterprise be
privatized as such because of the requirement of neutrality as
to rules governing property ownership in Article 222 of the
Treaty of Rome. Nevertheless, in the future the use of such
aids simply to preserve employment without restructuring
leading to privatization will be seriously called into question,
outside as well as within the European Union.74
Rather different considerations apply to measures to re-
lieve the effects of unemployment and local industrial decline
caused by restructuring before and after privatization. These
measures are well accepted and have been employed in many
different cases. To return to the example of the United King-
dom coal industry, after the difficulties encountered with sale
of coal for electricity generation described above, it was esti-
mated that 30,000 jobs would be lost in the coal industry plus
20,000-25,000 in other industries in coal mining communities.
Special redundancy terms were agreed which would result in
payments to miners with 15 years service of an average of
£23,000. Additional help would come from British Coal Enter-
prises, a subsidiary of the coal mining enterprise, which would
provide financial support for job creating businesses,
workspace for new businesses and job resettlement. The efforts
were highly concentrated in the close-knit mining communi-
ties, for which £200 million was made available for regenera-
tion, including training and inward investment.75 Despite the
serious controversy about the justifications for the running
down of the coal industry, it was carried out relatively smooth-
ly in these final stages with many miners voting to accept the
redundancy terms offered in the absence of any alternative,
although alternative employment growth in former mining
areas has been disappointing. Similar provision has been made
in the former East Germany where restructuring on privat-
ization of the old heavy industries has also had devastating
consequences for local communities. In this case the privatiza-
tion agency, the Treuhand, has favored investors who are pre-
pared to guarantee higher employment and continued invest-
July 18, 1994, at 3.
74. See Prosser & Moran, supra note 70, at 148-53.
75. PROSPECTS FOR COAL: CONCLUSIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S COAL REVIEW,
supra note 37, ch. 5.
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ment levels rather than simply those making the highest bids;
it has also in effect accepted negative sale prices through fund-
ing restructuring or start-up funds or loss compensation. 6
This has not prevented extensive unemployment, but it has
saved potentially viable jobs and eased the transition process.
The message from this section is a simple one; we must
expect privatization and the preparation for privatization to
result in serious social consequences. In the situation facing
the former Communist nations this may be unavoidable any-
way given the scale of the transition which has to be faced. So
far it has been handled without massive social disruption, but
some of the measures taken to maintain popular support for
privatization programs in the face of these social consequences
may undermine the underlying rationale of the programs, that
of subjecting enterprises to more effective market controls and
corporate governance. The balance between the different forces
will depend on the state of particular economies and, not least,
on the strength of political institutions.
V. REGULATORY ISSUES
Privatization is intimately bound up with the creation of
new institutions for the regulation of corporate behavior, both
in capital and product markets. A number of writers on East-
ern and Central Europe have noted that in those regions "capi-
talism is viewed simplistically by those who would like to em-
brace it as a well-oiled system consisting only of private prop-
erty ownership, pure laissez-faire, and a self-adjusting market
mechanism, requiring no government interference."" More
realistically, even in Western economies:
"[in every actual situation government presence is as perva-
sive as that of transaction costs. Moreover, the regulatory
activity of the government does not follow some abstract and
predetermined rules, but is basically reactive to the situation
in the market, both in terms of the content of regulation and
the process by which they are promulgated."' 8
76. Rudiger Dornbusch & Holger Wolf, East German Economic Reconstruction,
in 1 TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE: COUNTRY STUDIES, supra note 44, at 155.
77. Michael Bruno, Stabilization and Reform in Eastern Europe: A Preliminary
Evaluation, in 1 TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE: COUNTRY STUDIES, supra note
44, at 46; see also FRYDMAN & RAPACZYNSKI, supra note 5, at 169.
78. FRYDMAN & RAPACZYNSKI, supra note 5, at 172.
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On the one hand this applies to corporate governance and the
establishment and support of institutions through which such
governance can take place; it also applies to the necessity for
competition law since a major lesson of the privatization pro-
grams in the United Kingdom and elsewhere is that privatiza-
tion in itself does not necessarily create competition but may
even reduce it through facilitating takeovers, something illus-
trated clearly for example in United Kingdom aviation.79
These issues are outside the scope of a paper on the social
limits to privatization, but other problems raised by the regu-
lation of product markets do fall squarely within it.
These regulatory problems are of course most acute in
relation to the public utilities which have a considerable de-
gree of monopoly in their role. Thus, they have mainly arisen
in the United Kingdom given the prominent role of the utilities
in the privatization program, especially when compared to
nations such as France. However, it is now clear that other
nations are moving to privatize utilities; the example of Ger-
many has already been mentioned, and other European na-
tions are now selling parts of the utility sector, and even Rus-
sia is now drafting a law on regulating its utilities."0 Most
importantly, European Community policy concerned with liber-
alization of telecommunications, posts, energy and transport
markets is seeking to open up markets through limiting ex-
clusive rights for public enterprises and by requiring the sepa-
ration of regulatory functions from the provision of services.
This leads to a new model of European utility enterprise,
which may be under private or public ownership, but which
will be subject to regulation through forms and institutions not
dissimilar to those adopted on privatization in the United
Kingdom.8 The United Kingdom regulatory experience is
thus of broader significance; and indeed a chief justification for
both privatization there and liberalization in the European
79. For the relationship of privatization and competition in principle, see J.A.
Kay & Z.A. Silberstrom, The New Industrial Policy: Privatisation and Competition,
MIDLAND BANK REV., Spring 1994, at 8. For the aviation experience, see Mike
Cronshaw & David Thompson, Competitive Advantage in European Aviation - Or
Whatever Happened to BCal?, FISCAL STUDs., Feb. 1991, at 44.
80. John Thornhill, Russia Draws Up Legislation to Regulate Monopoly Indus-
tries, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1994, at 2.
81. See Prosser & Moran, supra note 70, at 148-50.
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Community is the degree of transparency which independent
regulation is believed to create when compared to the secretive
relations between government and public enterprise. We must
examine this more closely, however, as regulation is by no
means a simple activity.8 2
It is essential to understand that there are two very differ-
ent sorts of justification for regulation. The first is that of
enhancing economic efficiency through providing surrogates for
market forces which would otherwise not come into play due to
the existence of natural monopoly characteristics in parts of
the enterprises' markets.83 However, there are inevitably oth-
er regulatory rationales drawn not from the goal of efficiency
maximization in the sense used by economists but from social
concerns; and notably the principle of universal service. These
principles prevail over efficiency maximization in particular
circumstances and are founded on egalitarian rights of access
for the whole community to the basic means of communication
and of fuel.84 The latter principles loom large in the statutory
objectives for the United Kingdom regulators and the concept
of "public service" through which they are expressed is central
to debates on utility liberalization in the European Union.8
Regulatory history in the United Kingdom has shown that
the regulation of privatized utilities creates two particular
sorts of problems. The first is clearly social in origin, and re-
fers to the requirement that a universal service be provided at
standard rates, a requirement based on distributive concerns.
A problem is that under public ownership the pricing policies
of utility enterprises were not closely aligned to costs, instead
involving large cross-subsidies, largely in order to avoid geo-
graphical variations in rates and often providing an element of
subsidy to economically underprivileged groups, especially
small domestic consumers. These pricing policies often had
strong public support in view of the perception that the servic-
es provided by the utilities were part of the necessities of life,
82. For the inevitable political background to privatization and regulation, see
FRYDim & RAPACZYNSKI, supra note 5, at 168-77.
83. For a sophisticated defense of this as the role of the utility regulator, see
generally FOSTER, supra note 2.
84. For a detailed defense of such rights-based regulatory principles, see Tony
Prosser, Privatisation, Regulation and Public Services, JURID. REV., Mar. 1994, at
3-17.
85. Id. at 12-17.
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particularly in the case of fuel and water. It has proved diffi-
cult to maintain such policies after privatization. The main
reason is a simple one; to enhance economic efficiency, privat-
ization has been accompanied by the encouragement of compe-
tition. However, where internal cross-subsidy exists within a
firm, competitors will be able to engage in "cream-skimming"
or "cherry-picking" by competing only in those areas of the
market where the utilities' prices are above costs. The response
to this involves preserving elements of monopoly to permit the
cross-subsidy to continue, or applying regulatory constraints to
all new entrants to preserve cross-subsidy (a highly complex
solution in practice)" or permitting the utility to rebalance its
prices to bring them more closely into line with costs, a highly
politically controversial solution as it is seen as withdrawing
entrenched provision for less well-off groups.
The problem was met early on in the case of telecommuni-
cations, where both statute and the license under which Brit-
ish Telecom operates contain important universal service ele-
ments.87 An immediate problem which confronted the telecom-
munications regulator was permitting the rebalancing of the
company's charges upon privatization to reflect costs more
closely; this had far greater benefits for business customers
than for domestic users. The solution adopted was, whilst
largely permitting rebalancing, to treat low-income users of
telephones as a special group needing protection through a
special tariff, and to require contributions from competitors
towards the cost of British Telecom's losses incurred in those
areas priced below cost, a policy which has inevitably proved
highly controversial and the details of which are currently the
subject of litigation." The same problem has arisen in the
86. See CORRY ET AL., supra note 33.
87. British Telecommunications Act, 1984, ch. 12, § 3(i)(a) (Eng.); OFFICE OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, LICENCE GRANTED
BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE AND INDUSTRY TO BRITISH TELECOMMUNI-
CATIONS UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT 1984, at 11, 17
(1991).
88. This policy is intimately tied up with the question of the terms of inter-
connection with competitors to the BT network. See OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS, STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS:
INTERCONNECTION AND ACCOUNTING SEPARATION: THE NEXT STEPS (1994). A similar
policy is proposed for European Union telecommunications liberalization by the
European Commission. See Communication from the Commission to the Council,
the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee: Developing
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case of gas, where proposals made by the Monopolies and
Mergers Commission for the liberalization of the domestic gas
market (continued as a British Gas monopoly on its privatiza-
tion in 1986) have raised the likelihood of substantial increases
in charges for small domestic users; indeed, it seems possible
that the political implications of this may delay the introduc-
tion of legislation to end the monopoly." The need to retain
cross-subsidization seems to have lain behind the decision not
to privatize the Scottish ferry network run by Caledonian
MacBrayne and the proposal to privatize the Royal Mail was
embarrassingly withdrawn by the United Kingdom government
at an advanced stage, largely due to fears by backbench mem-
bers of Parliament for the network of rural post offices and the
geographically uniform letter rate."
The second major regulatory problem can be dealt with
very briefly as it is to some degree outside the scope of this
paper, being concerned with extending competition rather than
specifically social issues. In many cases, the privatized utility
enterprises own networks which have to be used by competi-
tors; again the most important examples are British Telecom
and British Gas, although in the case of electricity the
transmission network was privatized as a separate company
owned through a holding company by the twelve regional dis-
tribution and supply companies. Much regulatory attention has
had to be paid to the question of how to ensure access on com-
petitive terms to the network by competitors. In the case of
British Telecom, this has been accomplished by detailed regu-
latory controls and the requirement of separate accounts for
the network business.9' In the report on gas mentioned above,
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission went so far as to
recommend that British Gas be required to divest its supply
operation in order to prevent a conflict between supply and
Universal Services for Telecommunications in a Competitive Environment,
COM(93)543 final.
89. See MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS COMMISSION, GAS, 1993, Cm 2314. For pro-
posed regulatory responses, see OFFICE OF GAS SUPPLY, COMPETITION AND CHOICE
IN THE GAS MARKET (1994).
90. See generally THE FUTURE OF POSTAL SERVICES, 1994, Cm 2614. For the
withdrawal of the proposals, see Kevin Brown, Cabinet Forced to Cancel Post Of-
fice Sell-Off, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1994, at 1. For the ferries decision, see James
Buxton, Scottish Ferry Line Sell-Off Rejected, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1994, at 13.
91. See OFFICE OF TELECOMIUNICATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUS-
TRY, supra note 87.
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transmission of competitors' gas; however, this was rejected by
the Government which instead will require full and strict sepa-
ration of supply and transportation operations, policed by the
regulator. Once more we find that regulatory problems are of
considerable complexity where networks are involved.
The message of this section is that, where a public utility
is privatized and part of the underlying rationale for this is to
permit the development of competition in supply of some parts
of its service (and this rationale is fundamental to programs in
the European Union mentioned above), very difficult regulato-
ry problems will be raised. At the least, they will involve regu-
latory institutions and guidance of a considerable degree of so-
phistication, and are also likely to lead to a diminution of the
provision of universal services at standard rates. If a govern-
ment is not able to provide such regulatory arrangements, or if
such universal service is its central concern, privatization is
not likely to be an attractive option unless the privatized en-
terprise retains its monopoly. This in turn undermines a key
objective of privatization and leads to well-justified attacks to
the effect that a public monopoly has simply been transferred
into a private monopoly.
VI. TRANSACTION COSTS
The final potential limit to privatization concerns the issue
of transaction costs where a public enterprise is split into a
number of companies which compete and yet also have cooper-
ative interrelationships; some of the problems have already
been suggested by the networks problem, and problems of
transaction costs may also arise where cross-subsidy is being
ended having been previously supported by a universal service
obligation. For example, differential prepaid postal rates raise
the issue in an acute form. The most important and contro-
versial United Kingdom example is that of the rail network,
which is in the process of being split into about 100 companies,
of which about 50 will be of importance.92 This is justified pri-
marily on grounds of increased competition and of transparen-
cy; the creation of contractual relationships between the actors
92. See Railways Act, 1993, ch. 43 (Eng.); NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE RAIL-
WAYS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF BRITISH RAIL, supra note 42. On general economic
issues, see CORRY ET AL., supra note 33, at 5, 122-28.
1995] 239
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
will force the costs of different parts of the network out into
the open for the first time; the process also reflects a move
within private business away from hierarchical relationships
within large firms internalizing as many operations as possible
towards "out-sourcing" and contractual relationships. 3 The
danger however is that the division will seriously increase the
complexity of the system and so increase transaction costs,
particularly through the contractualization of relationships and
the resulting litigation. Particular problems will be posed by
the fact that the operating companies having franchises run-
ning services will be required to compensate passengers for
delays and cancellations, yet the causes will often be outside
their control. For example, many delays will be caused by the
company running the network, which is responsible for track
and signalling.
This move from hierarchy to contract contradicts much
received wisdom about modernity and the move from contract
to administration; indeed there is much sociological evidence to
suggest that the use of contractual techniques and sanctions is
precisely what businessmen have sought to avoid because of
transaction costs and other effects such as loss of goodwill.94
Much will depend on the ability of the participants in the sys-
tem to construct simplified arrangements for the allocation of
liabilities which avoid the need for litigation; such a scheme is
now being negotiated although the relatively short duration of
franchises (in some cases as short as seven years) may work
against this. Indeed, industrial action by signal workers em-
ployed by the infrastructure company has already seriously
threatened the plans for sale of the train operating companies,
demonstrating the interdependent nature of the industry.
Again the message is that the rationales for privatization of
competition and transparency are dependent on the ability to
create quite sophisticated regulatory or self-regulatory process-
es, and if these are not present transaction costs may outweigh
any efficiency gains resulting from privatization.
93. See FOSTER, supra note 2.
94. Eugene Kamenka & Alice E. Tay, Beyond Bourgeois Individualism: The
Contemporary Crisis in Law and Legal Ideology, in FEUDALISM, CAPITALISM AND
BEYOND (Eugene Kamenka & R.S. Neale eds., 1976); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Con-
tractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 58
(1963).
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
Previous debate, at least at a popular level, on limits to
privatization has tended to center around inherent limits to
the nature of the enterprises which can be sold and whether a
natural core of necessarily governmental activity exists, or on
whether it is possible to privatize enterprises which undertake
unprofitable activities. This paper has suggested a different
approach, one more related to the purpose of privatization. No
doubt a government bent on privatizing enterprises simply to
gain the receipts of sales to assist its budget could dispose of
any enterprise with a reasonable degree of financial health or
which is promised continuing subsidies or contractual pay-
ments, leaving the problems to be faced by successor govern-
ments. However, the privatization program across the world
has been presented as more than simply a solution to short-
term budgetary constraints, and the other goals adopted sug-
gest an approach based not on assessing whether the inherent
nature of an enterprise makes it suitable for privatization, but
whether it will succeed in these goals without imposing costs
which outweigh the gains. Thus we should ask whether privat-
ization can take place in a way which actually improves corpo-
rate governance rather than protecting insiders, whether the
social costs can be successfully borne without discrediting the
whole economic reform program, and whether the required
degree of sophistication is possible in regulatory design, espe-
cially when we are thinking of privatizing enterprises which
deliver what are regarded as basic services or run transmission
networks.
Experience in different countries has illustrated different
answers to these questions. In Poland and Hungary, for exam-
ple, a backlash against the economic reforms with which pri-
vatization has become associated was widely credited with the
success of the former Communists and their allies in the Sep-
tember 1993 and May 1994 elections, success which did not in
fact stop the privatization program but which highlights the
difficulty of ensuring its legitimation; despite the relative suc-
cess of the Czech privatization program, something similar
seems to have occurred in Slovakia. 95 In the United Kingdom,
95. Vincent Boland, Slovakia Faces a Shift to Extremes of Government, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1994, at 3.
1995]
242 BROOK. J. INTL L. [Vol. XXI:1
on the other hand, the Thatcher and Major Governments were
able to engage in privatization on an unprecedented scale with-
out losing popular support, partly because of the extreme de-
gree of flexibility offered to a United Kingdom Government
with a Parliamentary majority to implement policy and the
weakness of the Parliamentary opposition, partly because of
short-term electoral advantage gained by promoting wider
share ownership. This is not to say that there have been no
problems in the privatization process, however, nor that seri-
ous regulatory difficulties have not emerged since. The mes-
sage of this paper is that, whilst there are no inherent limi-
tations to what can be privatized, there are limits of political
and regulatory design which sometimes make privatization
inappropriate.
